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Assessing the risk of
GMOs
With the recent breakdown
of discussions at the Biosafety Protocol negotiations in Cartagena and the
concerns over genetically modified organisms (GMOs) reverberating once again, Topsy
Jewell and Andy Stirling review the limitations and potential of a
recent bid to apply the science of risk assessment in this field.
In 1995, the parties to the Convention on
Biological Diversity called for an international protocol on biosafety based on
the principles embodied in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
and in particular the precautionary approach. In response to this call, the
Edmonds Institute, a public interest, non-profit organisation based in the
US and a NGO observer at the Biosafety Protocol negotiations, invited a group of
scientists from a range of biological disciplines to evaluate the potential
impacts of GMOs and to develop a series of biosafety assessment
procedures. Their aim was to provide a means to assess in advance whether a
particular GMO will yield the anticipated benefits and whether environmental or
human health effects may result from any deliberate or inadvertent consequences
of its release.
Bioassessment
manual
The result is a technical manual setting out a clear
step-by-step bioassessment process. The manual is aimed at scientists, decision
makers, regulators and manufacturers and was presented to delegates at the
recent Biosafety Protocol negotiations in Cartagena. While all countries are
vulnerable to unforeseen dangers of GMOs, some countries are more at
risk-particularly those with insufficient scientific, financial or
administrative capacities to establish a risk assessment programme. For these
countries, the manual may prove a particularly useful tool. The user is guided
through a series of questions presented in a set of flow diagrams. Each step is
well annotated to aid decisions. The procedures can be applied to a variety of
GMOs, including those created from viruses, bacteria, fungi, plants, and
animals. The process identifies potential hazards and offers recommendations to
minimise risks.
The Edmonds Institute rightly recognises that uncertainty is a critical factor
in the assessment of GMOs; that ecological systems and the behaviour of
organisms are highly complex; and that efforts at prediction are extremely
precarious. Yet it is here that the manual displays its greatest weakness, but
one that is intrinsic to the task rather than to the efforts of the authors.
Any attempt to apply an orthodox risk assessment approach to
the problem of GMO releases-no matter how systematic and apparently
comprehensive it may be-encounters a number of serious practical and
theoretical obstacles. GMOs are novel. The contexts for their application are
diffuse, diverse and dynamic in nature. There are inherent limitations to the
scientific understandings of the highly complex systems into which they are to
be released. Taken together, these factors all serve to undermine the authority
of the risk assessment calculus. The problem lies not only in estimating
probabilities, but in characterising the possibilities themselves.
The permutations of the possible effects of GMOs and their
associated agricultural strategies are truly vast in number. As experience has
shown repeatedly in the environmental domain, some of the most important impacts
are intrinsically unforeseeable in nature. The early history of pesticides
provides an example, as do more recent experiences with ozone depletion, BSE and
hormone disrupting chemicals. The advent of GMOs raises the prospect of a host
of potential threats of this sort: irreversible transformations in the genetic
composition of established crops, wild plants or microbial life; the fostering
of pest resistance, dependence on herbicides or antibiotic resistance; and the
creation of new human food allergies, nutritional effects or toxic reactions.
The potential for surprises in such areas transcends even the notion of
'uncertainty' and places us firmly in the realm of 'ignorance'.
Risk assessment methodology is used as the basis of 'sound
science' in environmental appraisal, but there is a tendency in some quarters
to regard risk assessment as both a necessary and sufficient condition for sound
science in environmental appraisal. Yet the concept of 'ignorance' is just
as well-founded in the science of probability as the concept of 'risk'. It
simply refers to the condition under which we lack information both on the
likelihoods of different possible outcomes and on the possible nature of some of
the outcomes. Under these circumstances, the procedures of risk assessment
are-even in their own terms-quite simply inapplicable. Precaution-rather
than the narrow business of risk assessment- offers the most 'sound
scientific' response.
It is on this point that the biosafety assessment procedures,
as presented in the manual, fall well short of the precautionary approach.
Even the more technical aspects of appraisal, raise issues which require greater
emphasis. For instance, the potential for cumulative, additive or synergistic
effects involving different GMOs. 'Indirect' effects arising from the
agricultural practices associated with GMOs (such as pesticide use) are also
important. There are also crucial difficulties involved in the relative
weighting of different aspects of the risk issue: balancing considerations such
as biodiversity, occupational health and food safety.
The most important issue concerns the role for wider
consultation and deliberation involving stakeholders. The framing assumptions
and priorities adopted in risk assessment are intrinsically subjective. For
instance, appraisal is not just a matter of the case by case evaluation of
individual GMOs, but of comparing a range of different agricultural and food
strategies. Assessments of the importance of ignorance are also necessarily
subjective. The systematic involvement of interested and affected parties in the
appraisal process is therefore not just a matter of trust, expediency and
democratic principles. It is also a matter of analytical rigour. How else can
assumptions over the scope and framing of analysis and the presentation of
results be verified and validated? The essential role of participatory
deliberation in risk assessment is now acknowledged by bodies such as the US
National Research Council and the UK Royal Commission on Environmental
Pollution. There is no shortage of practical advice on the conduct of this
increasingly important dimension in risk assessment. The details may lie beyond
the scope of a technical manual but, the issues should be acknowledged.
Conclusion
The carefully developed procedures clearly described
in the Edmonds Institute manual will provide a useful source of prompting and
quality control in the risk assessment of GMOs. However they do not offer a
sufficient basis for the regulatory appraisal of these new technologies. Even in
the terms of 'sound science' in the regulation of GMOs, the precautionary
aims of the Biodiversity Convention require us to go beyond the limited
framework of conventional risk assessment. And in the end the justification for
the use of particular GMOs must, as with other risks, be grounded as much in the
politics of credibility, legitimacy and accountability as in the inherently
limited and imperfect science of risk assessment.
Manual for Assessing Ecological and Human
Health Effects of Genetically Engineered Organisms Scientists Working Group on
Biosafety, Edmonds Institute, Edmonds, Washington, US, 2 volumes, 245pp, 1998.
Topsy
Jewell is an environmental researchers. Andy Stirling is a lecturer at the
Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex.
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Breakdown of biosafety talks
170 nations met in Cartagena, Colombia (14-23
February) to finalise the Biosafety Protocol on the international movement
and trade in GMOs. The Biosafety Protocol is being negotiated under the
auspices of the Convention on Biological Diversity. It sets out an
international framework for safety standards for GMOs. Its objective is to
give priority to safety issues over trade interests. Many countries do not
have domestic laws to regulate GMOs and may be at risk from their
deliberate transport or inadvertent spread. The negotiations broke down
after the US, which is not even a Party to the Convention, and five other
grain exporting countries (Canada, Australia, Argentina, Chile, and
Uruguay) repeatedly blocked decisions. Sixty-three countries denounced the
negotiating process as secretive and undemocratic. In the end, the
Biosafety Protocol discussions had to be abandoned and may be reconvened
in six to 18 months.
Viola Sampson, Womens' Environment
Network (WEN), London
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[This
article first appeared in Pesticides News No. 43,
March 1999, page 5]
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